![]() It fell to Hitler to decide on the matter, and typically he chose an unworkable solution. He hoped too that the morale of the infantry manning the beach defences would be strengthened by the presence of elite formations beside them. He wanted every tank as near to the coast as possible, where in his view the battle would be won or lost. In contrast, Rommel feared that Allied air superiority would expose the panzers to devastating fighter-bomber attacks, preventing their movement. Von Schweppenburg was keen to keep the armour well back, hidden north of Paris, until the Allies were committed, and then launch a mass counterattack. These divisions represented the real striking force in the German order of battle, but authority over their deployment and use had become a major bone of contention. For administrative purposes they came under OB West, but von Rundstedt had no direct control over them. They were held in an armoured reserve called Panzer Group West, commanded by General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg. These Ost battalions made up one-sixth of Seventh Army’s total number of men.ĭefeat of the Allies would hinge on the nine panzer divisions and one panzergrenadier division in theatre, with a total of over 1,400 tanks and self-propelled guns. Many were former Soviet POWs and were generally regarded as having little value. Some also had contingents of Osttruppen, conscripts or volunteers from the Soviet Union and other eastern territories occupied by Germany. They contained older troops, the medically unfit, and men recovering from wounds. ![]() These had little in the way of transport, and were merely expected to man fixed defences and hold their ground. The more numerous ‘static’ coast divisions were much less effective. Most had good artillery provision, and were leavened by officers and NCOs with valuable combat experience in the East. The army field divisions and the Luftwaffe parachute divisions were largely experienced and well equipped, even though their size had been reduced to cope with manpower shortages. The quality of German infantry divisions varied greatly. It was commanded by Hitler’s favourite, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who enjoyed a level of access to the Führer unavailable to other commanders, including von Rundstedt. Army Group B contained Seventh Army, defending Normandy and Brittany, and Fifteenth Army north of the River Seine. He had two Army Groups under his command – Army Group B in northern France and the Netherlands, and Army Group G in the South of France. However, in accordance with Hitler’s directive, units started to be transferred from other fronts, so that by the end of May 1944 a total of 58 German divisions (out of nearly 300) were positioned in France, Belgium and the Netherlands.Īll German armed forces in the West came under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, as Commander-in-Chief West ( Oberbefehlshaber West or OB West). The coastline was held by a thin line of garrison troops, from where the fittest and most able had been combed to feed the meat-grinder in the East. The defence of ‘Fortress Europe’ would therefore fall squarely onto the shoulders of the army.įrance and the Low Countries had long been places where divisions burnt out on the Russian Front were sent to recuperate. Its U-boats would have an almost impossible job penetrating the belt of Allied naval and air defences. The Navy’s warships had been hounded to destruction or were bottled up in ports. The Luftwaffe had withdrawn nearly all its fighters to counter American daylight bombing operations over Germany. Germany’s air force and navy could do little to resist invasion. He would reinforce the western defences, launch a furious counterattack and ‘throw the Allies back into the sea’. 51, issued on 3 November 1943, Hitler warned of ‘consequences of staggering proportions’ if the western Allies should gain a foothold. But now, with invasion clearly imminent, Germany’s already stretched armed forces faced the prospect of another major front being opened. In 19 Anglo-American forces concentrated on offensives in North Africa and the Mediterranean, which ruled out a return to northern Europe. After defeat in France in 1940 Britain had been too weak to intervene in Europe. By the spring of 1944 Germany had been dominant in western Europe for four years.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |